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Abstract  tions.  Even though  soybean  prices across  the U.S.
Risk-efficient portfolios from a subset of market-  tend  to  move  together,  the  magnitude  of  price
ing strategies were identified using Target MOTAD.  changes varies across production areas due to differ-
Portfolios were generated for Illinois, Arkansas, and  ing regional production and marketing  characteris-
South Carolina to determine whether regional price  tics  (e.g.,  acreage  planted,  yield,  storage capacity,
and yield characteristics  affected the optimal  mar-  local demand, and available marketing alternatives).
keting strategy selection during 1972-1985. The re-  In  addition,  yields  and  costs  are  different  across
suits  support  previous  conclusions  that  the  risk  soybean producing regions. Thus, one might expect
borne when  following a combination  of marketing  the income risk associated with a marketing strategy
strategies  was less than the risk of any single mar-  to be different across regions and therefore the opti-
keting strategy examined. The results also show that  mal mix of risk-reducing strategies to be different.
the marketing  strategies representing efficient risk-  The  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  develop  and
return  combinations  for  a  producer  in  one region  compare risk-efficient portfolios of marketing strat-
were different from  the efficient risk-return combi-  egies  for  soybean  producers  in  different  regions
nations for a producer in another region.  Therefore,  during the period 1972-1985.  The three major soy-
generic marketing  advice would have produced re-  bean producing regions were studied: the Southeast,
suits less preferred in one region  than in another.  the Midwest, and the delta as represented  by South
Carolina, Illinois,  and Arkansas,  respectively.  Illi-
Key words:  Target MOTAD, risk-efficient portfo-  nois and Arkansas  were chosen because they  were
lio, futures and options contracts,  significant producing  states  in  their respective  re-
hedging.  gions.  South Carolina was selected because it was
the state in which the study was conducted. Specific
A~Sdoybean~~~~  poc  iI  neSobjectives  of  the  study  were  (1)  to  examine  the
Soybean  producers  in  the United  States  face  in-  average revenue and risk of each soybean marketing
come risk from various factors  including yield and  strategy included in the set of representative  strate-
price variability, government  policies, and shifts in  gies  during  the  study  period,  and  (2)  to  compare
foreign supply and demand.  Better marketing tech-  risk-efficient  portfolios  for  the  three  states  to  see
niques  may  enable  producers  to  reduce  this  risk  how sensitive portfolio composition is to differences
while maintaining adequate  expected income. Pro-  in location.
ducers should  analyze alternative marketing strate-
gies  (e.g.,  forward pricing some  of their expected
output, selling  their output at different times  of the  MARKETING  STRATEGIES
year,  and  using  the  futures  market  to  establish  a  Producers can sell in the cash market at harvest or
minimum  selling price).  Previous studies have ana-  any time after harvest. They can forward price prior
lyzed numerous alternative marketing strategies and  to planting, at planting, or any time during the grow-
determined the preferred combinations  of strategies  ing and/or storage season.  This analysis considered
for a particular commodity during  a particular time  only a selected subset of marketing strategies  from
period (e.g., Holland et al.; Bolen et al.; Persuad and  those  available  to  soybean  producers.  Thirty-two
Mapp;  Klinefelter  et  al.; Curtis  et al.). However,  strategies from ten marketing categories were exam-
most studies have focused on a single location. The  ined over the  marketing  years  1972 through  1985
risk-efficient combinations  of marketing  strategies  (Table 1).  In selecting  the subset of strategies, cash
for one location may not be efficient for other loca-  market sales were assumed to occur during the first
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167Table  1. Soybean Marketing  Strategies Examined
1.CASH  MARKET  SPECULATIVE  STRATEGIES
(1.1)  Sell in cash market in  November.
(1.2) Store  production  unpriced and sell in cash market in April.
2.  ROUTINE  HEDGE
(2.3)  In May sell January contract, offset in  November.
(2.4)  In  July sell January. contract, offset in November.
(2.5)  In  July sell May contract, offset in April.
(2.6)  In November sell May contract, offset in  April.
3. ROUTINE  NEAR-THE-MONEY  PUT OPTION  PURCHASEa
(3.7)  In May buy  put option on January contract, offset in November.
(3.8)  In July buy  put option on January contract, offset in November.
(3.9) In July buy  put option on May contract, offset in  April.
(3.10)  In November buy put option on  May contract, offset in  April.
4.SELECTIVE  THREE  -AND  FIVE-WEEK  MOVINGb AVERAGE  HEDGE.  START MONITORING  MOVING  AVERAGE
SIGNAL IN:
(4.11)  May,  sell January contract, offset in  November.
(4.12) July, sell January contract, offset in November.
(4.13) July, sell May contract, offset in April.
(4.14) November,  sell May contract, offset in  April.
5.SELECTIVE  THREE - AND FIVE-WEEK  MOVING  AVERAGE  NEAR-THE-MONEY  PUT OPTION PURCHASE.
START MONITORING  MOVING AVERAGE IN:
(5.15) May,  buy put option on  January contract, offset in November.
(5.16) July, buy put option  on January contract, offset in November.
(5.17) July, buy put option on  May contract, offset in  April.
(5.18) November,  buy put option on  May contract, offset in  April.
6.  MULTIPLE  SELECTIVE  THREE - AND  FIVE-WEEK  MOVING  AVERAGE  HEDGE.  START  MONITORING  MOVING
AVERAGE  IN:
(6.19) May,  continue selling and offsetting  hedges on January contract based on  signals generated  until November.
(6.20) July, continue selling and offsetting  hedges on January contract based on  signals generated  until November.
(6.21)  July, continue selling  and offsetting  hedges on  May contract based on signals generated  until April.
(6.22)  November, continue selling and offsetting  hedges on May contract based on signals generated  until April.
7.  TOTAL COST-PLUS  HEDGE  WHEN  LOCALIZED  FUTURES  PRICE EQUALS OR EXCEEDS  THE OBJECTIVE
PRICE.  STARTING  IN:
(7.23)  May,  sell January contract, offset in  November.
(7.24) July,  sell January contract, offset in November.
(7.25) July, sell  May contract, offset in  April.
(7.26)  November sell May contract,  offset in April.
8.VARIABLE  COST - PLUS  NEAR-THE-MONEY  PUT OPTION  PURCHASE  WHEN THE  LOCALIZED  FUTURES
PRICE  EQUALS  OR EXCEEDS  THE  OBJECTIVE  PRICE.  STARTING  IN:
(8.27) May,  buy put option on  January contract,  offset in November.
(8.28)  November,  buy put option on  May contract, offset in  April.
9.TOTAL  COST-PLUS NEAR-THE-MONEY  PUT OPTION  PURCHASE  WHEN  THE LOCALIZED  FUTURES  PRICE
EQUALS OR  EXCEEDS  THE OBJECTIVE  PRICE.  STARTING  IN:
(9.29)  May,  buy put option on January contract,  offset in  November.
(9.30)  November,  buy put option on  May contract, offset in  April.
10.  FUTURES/OPTIONS  MARKET  SPECULATIVE  STRATEGIES
(10.31) Sell crop on  cash market and buy a May futures contract to be offset in  April.
(10.32) Sell crop on  cash market and buy a May  near-the-money  call option contract to be  offset in  April.
aOption contracts are allowed  to expire whenever the option premium is less than the transaction  costs of exercising
the option.
bFor strategies involving  buying and offsetting futures or option contracts, the cash  market sale is assumed to occur
when the futues  or options position is offset in either  November or April.
168week in November  (harvest)'  or during April (after  market position was taken and the crop was sold on
storage); forward pricing was considered beginning  the cash market at the date specified in the strategy.
in  the  second  week  in May  (at planting),  in  July  Futures  Market Speculation-The  two strategies in
(during the growing season), or in the first week in  category 10 involved selling all the production in the
November.  All futures  contracts and profitable op-  cash  market  at harvest  and  either buying  a  May
tions were offset at the time of the cash market sale.2 futures contract  or a May  near-the-money  call op-
Cash Market Speculation-The strategies  in cate-  tion and offsetting the position in April.
gory  1 involved remaining  unpriced until all of the  Strategy performance  was measured by expected
production  was  sold  in  the  cash  market  in  either  revenues per acre (i.e.,  expected totl revenues net revenues per acre (i.e., expected total-revenues November or April.  less  storage and marketing  transaction  costs). Pro-
Routine Hedge or Option Purchase--Strategies  in  duction costs were not subtracted because they were
categories 2  and 3 involved  routinely selling  a fu-  identical  across marketing  strategies.  Many previ-
tures contract (category 2)  ai  ous studies have analyzed strategies according  near-the-t
money  put  option  contract  (category  3)  in  May,  price received  (e.g.,  Curtis  et al.).  However,  such
July,  or  November  and  offsetting  the  position  in  studies overlook yield risk. Yield risk was incorpo-
November or April, when the soybeans were sold.  rated  to  some  degree  in  this  study  by  using  an
Selective Moving Averages Hedge or Option Pur-  expected  yield  in  evaluating  marketing  strategies
chase-In categories  4,  5,  and 6,  three-and  five-  that were executed before harvest and using actual
week moving averages  were monitored for a "sell"  yields for strategies that were executed at harvest or
signal beginning in May, July, orNovember. A"sell"  following  harvest.  However,  differences  between
signal  was generated when  the three-week moving  expected yield  and actual yield  have different im-
average crossed and fell below the five-week mov-  pacts on the outcomes of the various strategies.  An
ing average.  Once a position  in the futures  market  analysis of strategy outcomes thatincorporates these
(category  4)  or  options  market  (category  5)  was  yield forecast errors is more realistic than an analy-
taken,  it  was  held  until  the  cash  market  sale.  In  sis of strategy outcomes that assumes that yield can
category  6,  however,  after  taking  a  short  futures  be forecast perfectly.
position,  the  market  was  monitored  for  a  "buy"
signal  (i.e.,  when  the  three-week  average  crossed
and rose above the five-week average)  to offset the  TARGET MOTAD  MODEL
position.  Thus, short positions were placed and liq-  In a world of certainty, economic  theory indicates
uidated each  time the moving averages  crossed.  that firms maximize profits. When alternative  out-
Cost-plus Hedge or Option Purchase-In  catego-  comes  are  not  known  a priori, researchers  have
ries 7,  8, and 9, beginning in May, July, or Novem-  argued that risk must be incorporated  in the  objec-
ber, a cost-plus price objective was compared to the  tive function (Markowitz).
expected price obtained by hedging in futures or to
the expected  minimum price obtained by buying a  The Target MOTAD (Minimization of Total Abso-
put option. If the price objective could be covered,  lute Deviations) model,  as described by Tauer and
a  futures  contract  was  sold (category  7)  or a  put  Watts et al., provides  one method of incorporating
option contract was purchased (categories 8 and 9).  risk in  the objective  function.  In  Target  MOTAD,
The cost-plus price objective  was based on variable  risk  is defined  as  the absolute  value of deviations
costs (category  8) or total production costs (catego-  below a fixed target. The target can be fixed at any
ries  7 and 9)  and expected  yields if placed  before  level from which risk is to be measured. The ability
harvest. If the market action criteria in categories 4  to  measure  risk  from  an  independent  reference
through 9 were not met, then no futures or options  point,  rather  than  the  mean,  is  one  advantage  of
Target MOTAD  over MOTAD and mean-variance
analysis.
1  Although harvest for the three states varied over a period of nine weeks, the first week in November was used as the harvest
date because each of the three states  typically harvests to some degree in November (USDA, Usual Planting  and Harvesting  Dates
for U.S. Field  Crops).
2An option was profitable if the premium was  greater than the transaction cost of selling the option (in this study, if the premium
was greater  than two cents  per bushel).
3  A put option gives the buyer the right but not the obligation to sell an underlying futures contract at the stated strike price. A
near-the-money  option has a strike price nearest the prevailing futures price.
4Strategies  using moving averages  were included as examples of simple strategies incorporating technical factors. The three-
and five-week moving  averages were  arbitrarily selected  as indicators  of market trends.
169In this analysis, soybean producers were assumed  minimum negative deviations from the given target.
to be most concerned with covering their production  More specifically, the high end of the risk-efficient
costs each  year.  Producers were  assumed to maxi-  frontier was  a maximum  revenue  linear program-
mize  expected  profits  subject  to a certain  level of  ming solution where risk was not a constraint.  This
risk of not covering their production costs (or, equiv-  solution  gives  the  maximum  attainable  expected
alently,  minimize the risk of not covering their pro-  revenue.  The  minimum  point  of the  frontier  was
duction costs subject to a certain  level of expected  obtained by minimizing risk, with expected revenue
revenues).  Target MOTAD  is an appropriate model  greater  than  or equal  to  zero. Other  values  of ex-
because it permitted comparison of the strategies in  pected revenues  (approximately equally spaced be-
the three regions  based on this risk criterion (local  tween  the maximum and minimum E values) were
total production cost). By defining the target as total  used  to  determine  the  remaining  portfolios  pre-
production  costs  in each  region,  all strategies  and  sented on the frontier.  Risk-efficient frontiers were
portfolios of strategies  can be compared  according  generated  for each  state using estimated  total pro-
to their abilities to cover production costs. The spe-  duction  costs as the  target.  This  exogenous  target
cific  model used in this study is as follows:  was assumed representative  of the level of revenues
minimize vy,  required for long-run survival.  The total cost targets
subject to
Ax < or > b  Table 2.  1985-1986  Soybean Production Costsa
rx =  E,  South
(P - T)x+ IyŽ  > 0  Carolina  Illinois  Arkansas
Y~~~_  '  > 0(33  (45  (25
x, y-  0,  Item  bu/ac)  bu/ac)  bu/ac)
where  ------- $/acre-------
v = a 1-by-s vector in which each element is 1  Variable  Costs (V..):
Variable Costs (V.C.): and where s is the number of years consid-  Seed  8.00  10.00  7.88
ered (14 in the current study),  Fertilizer  29.52  23.00  8.12
y- = an s-by-l vector of the absolute value of  Chemicals  18.60  19.00  14.28 Machinery  28.04  30.00  32.29
annual  negative revenue deviations from  Labor  14.25  20.00  7.55
the fixed target,  Interest on
A = an m-by-n matrix of technical coefficients,  Operating  Capital  3.77  3.91  2.69
where m is the number of constraints  and n
is the number of strategies,  Total Variable  Costs  126.92  209.69  110.56
x = a n-by-I vector of strategies,  Fixed  Costs (F.C.):
b = a m-by-I  vector of constraints,  Machinery  35.83  42.00  37.27
r = a l-by-n vector of expected revenues for  Overhed  817  28.02  15.
each  strategy,  10% of (V.C.  + F.C.)  17.09  26.02  15.37 each strategy,
E = a scalar representing  expected revenue re-  Total  Production  Costs  188.02  286.18  169.02
quired by the decision maker,  aCosts are from  1985 state extension budgets, except
P =a  s-by-n matrix of actual revenues for each  for the noted adjustments to  make budgets consistent
P =  a s-by-n matrix of actual revenues  for each  across states.
activity in each year,  bThe annualized  1985 six month  T-bill rate was used to
T = a s-by-n matrix in which all elements are  estimated  the interest  on operating  capital for  six
months.
the fixed target (i.e., total production  costs),  CLand charges  represent "1985 Farms  Rented for Cash:
I = a s-by-s identity matrix, and  Gross Cash Rent per Acre"  obtained from  USDA, Agri-
cultural Resources: Land Values  and Markets.
0 = a column vector of appropriate length (s or  dA land charge  was not reported  for Arkansas  so the
n), composed  of zeros.  average  of the 1984 and  1986  land charge was used.
The risk-efficient frontier is generated by paramet-  eOverhead  charges  were calculated  as 8%  of total vari-
able costs, excluding  the land charge. rically  varying  expected  revenues  (E)  and re-opti-
mizing  the  model  to  find  the  portfolio  with  the
5The technical  constraints were (1)  the total amount produced had to be sold in the cash market during that crop year (i.e., in
November and/or April),  and  (2) preharvest  hedging was limited to no more than 60% of expected production to prevent losses from
over-selling in the futures market  when actual production was  less than expected.
170(including a 10 percent return for risk and manage-  by multiplying  the  state's average November  cash
ment) were $188.02, $286.18, and $169.02 per acre  price  (representative  of  the  value  the  producer
for South Carolina,  Illinois,  and Arkansas, respec-  forgoes when the decision to store the crop is made)
tively (Table 2).  by the monthly nominal six-month Treasury Bill rate
(Economic Report to the President) for the number
CALCULATION  OF STRATEGY  of months  the crop was to be stored.
PERFORMANCE ~~~PERFORMANCE  ^The marketing strategies in categories 7 through 9
Total  revenues  from  the  cash  market  were  the  required comparing a price objective to the localized
product of the monthly average cash price (USDA,  futures price. Two price objectives  were calculated
Agricultural Prices) and  the  state  average  yield6 based on estimated  variable and total costs of pro-
(USDA, Agricultural Statistics). Strategies involv-  duction for  each  state.  Production  costs  were  ob-
ing pricing  before harvest  used an  expected  yield  tained  from  each  state's  1985  soybean  enterprise
because the producer would not have perfect knowl-  budget (Clemson University Cooperative Extension
edge of actual yields. Expected yield was calculated  Service;  Hinton; University of Arkansas  Coopera-
as  the  median  of  the  state  average  yields  in  the  tive Extension Service).  Real production  costs for
previous three years. The median yield, rather  than  other years were  assumed to equal real  production
an average  yield, was used  to reduce the impact of  costs in 1985. The price objective included produc-
years with unusually high or low yields.  tion costs, marketing fees,  and any applicable stor-
All futures market transactions used the Thursday  age  charges.  Expected  state  average  yields  were
settlement price for Chicago Board of Trade (CBT)  used  to generate  per bushel  price  objectives.  The
soybeans (Wednesday prices were used if Thursday  premium  (i.e.,  price)  for a  near-the-money  option
was  a holiday).  The January  and May futures  con-  was estimated  and added  to the price  objective  in
tracts  were used  for strategies  lifting  in November  categories 8 and 9.
and  April,  respectively.  The  historical  basis  was  Since soybean options did not trade until 1984, no
calculated  as  the  difference  between  the  monthly  option premium data existed for the majority of the
state average cash price and the closing futures price  study period.  As a result, premiums were estimated
for the first Thursday  in the month.  The expected  for  the  entire  study  period  using  Black's  option
basis  (used  in  calculating  the  cost-plus  objective  pricing model in order to have a consistent measure
prices)  was  a  three-year  moving  average  of  the  of premiums. Wilson found no significant difference
historical basis in that month.  between soybean premiums estimated using Black's
Futures contract marketing fees  were assumed to  model and actual market premiums.  In  this study,
be three cents per bushel per round  turn (including  market volatility  for Black's model  was  estimated
both a commission and an allowance for slippage7).  with five weeks of historical prices as used by Wolf.
The fee for trading option  contracts was also  three  Strategy revenues were adjusted by the Prices Paid
cents  per bushel  per round  turn.  However,  if the  by Farmers Index (1985=100)  (USDAAgricultural
option contract  was unprofitable  to sell back, mar-  Statistics). The prices  paid index  was  chosen  be-
keting fees were only two cents per bushel.  cause it best reflects a producer's purchasing power
Revenues  generated by strategies  involving stor-  to  buy  additional  inputs.  If the  strategy  revenues
age  must  have  the  associated  storage  costs  sub-  were  not adjusted  for inflation,  strategies  that per-
tracted  before  they  are  compared  with  revenues  formed well  in the  later  years would  be weighted
generated  by  nonstorage  strategies.  In  this  study,  more heavily than strategies performing well in the
monthly storage costs consisted of the variable costs  earlier years because of differences in nominal rev-
of  physical  on-farm  storage  and  the  opportunity  enues.
costs of the grain in storage.
Variable costs of on-farm storage were assumed to  RESULTS
be constant  in real  terms  during  the period  1972-  The  average  revenue  and  average  risk per acre
1985.  These  variable  costs  were  estimated  as  associated  with each  individual  marketing strategy
$0.0224  per  bushel per  month  in  1983 dollars,  an  for South Carolina, Illinois, and Arkansas were cal-
estimate obtained from Farmer (1987) for a storage  culated and ranked (Tables 3 and 4). Risk was mea-
capacity of 13,000 bushels. In this study the oppor-  sured  as  the  sum  of  deviations  below  the  target
tunity cost of soybeans in storage was accounted for  divided by the number of years in the study period.
6The use of state average yields  rather than individual farm yields may underestimate  yield risk for an individual producer.
7  Slippage is the difference  between the price at which the producer expects an order to be filled and the price at which the order
is executed.
171Table  3. Average Revenue And  Revenue Ranking Of Individual Marketing  Strategies In South Carolina,  Illi-
nois And Arkansas,  1972-1985,  In 1985 Dollars.
South  Carolina  Illinois  Arkansas
Strategy  Average  Revenue  Average  Revenue  Average  Revenue
Numbera  Revenue  Ranking
b Revenue  Ranking
b Revenue  Rankingb
$/acre  $/acre  $/acre
1.1  157.89  21  274.45  20  182.37  17
1.2  168.11  6  289.89  5  187.63  7
2.3  144.24  32  250.85  32  166.67  32
2.4  154.73  25  267.72  26  178.68  25
2.5  162.04  14  280.05  12  181.22  20
2.6  165.65  9  282.21  11  185.19  11
3.7  160.44  16  278.96  16  185.11  12
3.8  157.27  22  272.86  21  181.70  19
3.9  165.38  10  284.50  9  184.50  14
3.10  173.52  1  298.03  1  193.13  1
4.11  152.21  30  264.73  29  175.67  29
4.12  154.12  28  267.23  28  178.09  27
4.13  161.73  15  279.98  13  180.63  22
4.14  158.77  18  270.48  24  177.86  28
5.15  156.75  23  272.75  22  180.79  21
5.16  151.90  31  263.78  30  175.42  30
5.17  166.06  8  285.90  8  185.24  10
5.18  166.19  7  284.45  10  185.43  8
6.19  154.97  24  269.19  25  178.91  24
6.20  154.11  29  267.47  27  178.17  26
6.21  170.95  4  295.08  3  191.14  4
6.22  168.63  5  288.10  7  188.23  6
7.23  154.60  27  262.79  31  167.88  31
7.24  154.61  26  271.45  23  180.32  23
7.25  162.52  13  275.03  19  181.84  18
7.26  163.23  12  278.61  17  184.18  15
8.27  158.38  20  278.08  18  185.25  9
8.28  173.01  2  297.35  2  193.12  2
9.29  160.01  17  279.47  14  185.10  13
9.30  171.80  3  292.81  4  192.02  3
10.31  158.70  19  279.24  15  182.92  16
10.32  165.02  11  288.96  6  189.46  5
aThe strategies are defined in  Table 1.
bThe strategy with the  highest average revenue is ranked 1, second highest is ranked 2, etc.
All  three  states  shared  the  same  four  maximum  case,  portfolio  4  represented  the  combination  of
average  revenue  generating  strategies  (strategies  strategies that minimized risk with expected revenue
3.10,  6.21, 8.28, and 9.30). No single strategy was  greater than or equal to zero, given that the soybeans
the least risky in all states. However, category  three  were marketed within each crop year.
(routine put option purchases)  had the most strate-  In  Illinois  and Arkansas  at  least one  marketing
gies repeatedly ranking  in the ten least risky strate-  strategy  or  portfolio  generated  average  revenues
gies for all three states.  large  enough  to cover  the target  during  the study
Risk-efficient  frontiers  for each  state  were  de-  period;  however,  in  South  Carolina  this  was  not
rived using MPX-PC, a microcomputer based linear  observed. Of course, some producers may have cov-
programming  model (Pfeiffer). Risk-efficient  port-  ered  costs  because of  differences  in  yields,  costs,
folios lie all  along the risk-efficient  frontier. How-  local basis, and other circumstances.  Yet in actuality,
ever,  only  four  portfolios  along  each  frontier  are  many  producers  probably  had  substantially  lower
discussed (Table 5 and Figures 1 through 3). Portfo-  production costs than assumed here because of dou-
lio  1 for each  state  was  obtained  by  maximizing  ble-cropping  soybeans  and  wheat.  When  adjust-
expected  revenues  without  constraining  risk.  The  ments  were  made  to account  for double-crop  cost
other  points  were  generated  by  minimizing  risk  sharing  and  the  risk-efficient  frontier  was re-esti-
given  a specified  expected  revenue  level.  In  each  mated using a target of $109.47 per acre for South
172Table 4. Average Risk And  Risk Ranking Of  Individual Marketing  Strategies In South Carolina,  Illinois And
Arkansas,  1972-1985,  In 1985 Dollars.
South Carolina  Illinois  Arkansas
Target =  $188.02  Target = $286.18  Target = $169.02
Strategy  Average  Risk  Average  Risk  Average  Risk
Numbera  Riska  Rankingb  Risk  Rankingb  Risk  Rankingb
$/acre  $/acre  $/acre
1.1  36.46  20  26.13  12  12.14  10
1.2  35.66  17  35.36  25  15.14  21
2.3  46.85  32  46.10  31  20.64  31
2.4  39.83  26  39.31  28  15.80  26
2.5  32.09  6  25.83  10  12.50  12
2.6  31.34  4  21.58  2  10.12  3
3.7  34.13  9  20.89  1  8.99  1
3.8  36.57  21  24.68  5  12.28  11
3.9  32.03  5  30.64  19  13.82  16
3.10  30.70  2  24.97  7  11.69  5
4.11  42.52  30  39.42  29  15.48  23
4.12  41.12  29  33.07  23  14.69  19
4.13  35.33  16  24.14  4  12.64  13
4.14  35.03  12  31.21  22  15.69  25
5.15  37.18  22  24.96  6  11.75  7
5.16  40.30  28  29.97  16  16.23  27
5.17  33.00  7  30.66  20  15.44  22
5.18  35.99  18  35.78  26  17.73  29
6.19  39.48  25  30.10  17  15.69  24
6.20  40.03  27  27.18  13  14.93  20
6.21  30.16  1  26.08  11  14.05  18
6.22  35.24  15  34.02  24  16.94  28
7.23  39.38  24  42.82  30  20.66  32
7.24  38.34  23  38.52  27  14.00  17
7.25  34.55  10  30.83  21  11.88  8
7.26  34.86  11  28.01  14  11.93  9
8.27  36.20  19  21.97  3  8.99  2
8.28  31.21  3  25.65  9  11.69  6
9.29  35.19  14  25.61  8  10.99  4
9.30  33.97  8  30.62  18  13.52  14
10.31  43.59  31  47.15  32  19.02  30
10.32  35.15  13  29.48  15  13.74  15
aRisk is measured  as the absolute value of the sum of the deviations  below the total production cost target divided by
the number of years (i.e.,  14).
bThe strategy with the lowest average risk is  ranked  1,  the second lowest is ranked 2, etc. Strategies  having equal risk
are ranked based on  expected revenues.
Carolina  (state extension estimate  of total produc-  pie,  in  Illinois  the  least  risky  strategy  generated
tion costs in a double-crop system), the average risk  $20.89 per acre in average risk, whereas portfolio 4
for the maximum revenue portfolio dropped to only  generated only $19.69 per acre in average risk. Risk
$.10  per  acre  and  to  zero  for  the  minimum  risk  reduction  through  marketing  diversification  was
portfolio.8 also apparent in South Carolina and Arkansas.
As evident from Table  5, the risk from a portfolio  Strategy  3.10  (a routine  put option  purchase  in
of strategies  could have been lower than the risk of  November,  offsetting  in  April) comprised  100 per-
any  single  strategy  in  a given  state.  By combining  cent of the maximum average revenue portfolios  in
strategies with revenues that were less than perfectly  all three states. This result was expected because this
positively correlated,  revenues from a strategy that  strategy  generated  more  revenue  than  any  other
did  not  perform  well  in  one  year  are  offset by  a  strategy  in each state  over the  study period.  How-
strategy that performed well in that year.  For exam-  ever,  the  risk-efficient  portfolios  differed  across
8  Detailed results of this analysis are available from the authors  upon request.
173Table 5.  Risk-Efficient Portfolios Generated By Target  Motad Using Total  Production Costs As The Target
For South Carolina, Illinois, And  Arkansas, 1972-1985,  In 1985 Dollars.
Average  Average  Strategy as a Percentage of Portfolio
Portfolio  Revenue  Risk
Number  ($/acre)  ($/acre)  2.5  2.6  3.7  3.10  4.13  6.21  7.25  8.27
South Carolina: Target =  $188.02  per acre
1  $173.52  $30.70  100%
2  $171.28  $29.08  73%  17%  10%
3  $169.04  $28.45  20%  61%  19%
4  $166.80  $27.93  14%  41%  29%  16%
Illinois: Target = $286.18 per acre
1  $298.03  $24.97  100%
2  $291.89  $21.48  9%  59%  23%  9%
3  $285.76  $20.34  16%  28%  24%  23%  9%
4  $279.63  $19.69  10%  56%  34%
Arkansas: Target = $169.02 per acre
1  $193.13  $11.69  100%
2  $190.70  $10.59  69%  31%
3  $188.27  $9.48  38%  62%
4  $185.84  $8.44  91%  9%
states  at lower  risk levels.  For example,  the  least  Arkansas. Storage strategies comprised  100 percent
risky portfolios in South Carolina and Illinois con-  of each state's maximum revenue portfolio.
sisted mostly of routine put option purchases,  rou-  In  general, put option  purchase strategies  domi-
tine hedges, and selective hedges. For Arkansas,  the  nated the risk-efficient portfolios, accounting for 41
least-risk  portfolio  consisted  of  only  routine  put  to  100%  of  portfolio  composition.  Others  have
option purchases. Storage strategies represented  100  shown that  marketing  strategies involving  put op-
percent of South Carolina's least risk portfolio, and  tion purchases  often perform  almost as well as the
less than  50 percent  in  Illinois  and  10  percent  in  best possible strategy. Put option strategies perform
almost as well as cash sales when price increases and
almost as well as hedges when price declines  (Chi-
Average  Revenue/Acre
Aean$1751—2—_r  cago Board  of Trade,  1985).  Put option  strategies
~~~~~$174  -_~~  ~performed  well  in  this  analysis  because the  study
period included years with large price increases and
$173  - years with large price decreases.
$172 
^2/~  ~SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS
$171 
Risk-efficient portfolios were derived from a sub-
$170-  /  set of marketing strategies, using a Target MOTAD
3$169  3  model for producers in South Carolina, Illinois, and $169
Arkansas.  This study  differed from  many previous
$168  /  studies  analyzing  alternative  marketing  strategies
because  it  focused  on  the  effects  of  location  on
$167  4/  risk-efficient marketing strategy portfolio composi-
$166  tion. It also differed  from some previous studies  in
that it attempted to include yield risk by measuring
$165  '8  90  strategy performance in terms of expected revenues
$27  $28  $29  $30  $31ept
~~Figure  1A.  Risk-efficient Frontire  er  reer  Generathan  price  p  er  bushel.
Figure 1. Risk-efficient  Frontier Generated  by Tar-  Specific risk-efficient portfolios  were derived for
get MOTAD  Using  Total Production  the  specified  time  period  and locations  examined
Costs as the Target for South Carolina,  and would be expected to be risk-efficient for future
1972-1985,  in 1985  Dollars  periods only if the future period were like the study
174Average  Revenue/Acre  $195 Average  Revenue/Acre
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Figure 2. Risk-Efficient  Frontier Generated  by Tar-  Figure 3. Risk-Efficient  Frontier Generated by Tar-
get MOTAD  Using Total Production  get MOTAD  Using Total Production
Costs as the Target for Illinois,  1972-  Costs as the Target for Arkansas,  1972-
1985,  in 1985 Dollars  1985,  in 1985 Dollars
period. Nevertheless,  this study verified what previ-  In general,  the risk-efficient  portfolios contained
ous  studies  have  found,  that  risk  was  reduced  option  purchase  strategies  than  hedges.
through  diversifying  marketing  strategies.  More  Near-the-money  put  option  purchases  performed
specifically,  these results  show  that  risk-efficient  well  in  all  three  states  during  the  storage  period.
portfolio composition varied across regions, and put  Storage  strategies  represented  100%  of the maxi-
option purchase strategies  dominated most risk-ef-  mum average  revenue portfolio  in all thre states.
ficient portfolios.  However,  this finding  may  have been  different  if
The results also showed that the marketing strate-  total,  rather than variable,  storage  costs had been
gies representing efficient risk-return combinations  included.  Unpriced  cash  sale  strategies  (heavily
for a producer in one region were different from the  used by producers) and futures/options market spec-
efficient risk-return combinations for a producer in  ue  by p  a  f  market spec- efficient risk-return combinations  for a producer in  ulative strategies  did not enter any of the risk-effi-
another  region.  Therefore,  generic  market  advice  cient portfolios. Hence, over the period 1972-1985,
would have generated results less preferred  in one  higher  average  revenue  and/or lower  average risk
region than in another. This finding seems intuitive,  migh  have been achieved by forward pricing rather
given  the  differences  in  prices,  costs,  and  yields  than unpriced cash market sales.
across regions.
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